The main goal of this paper is to describe an axiomatic utility theory for Dempster-Shafer belief function lotteries. The axiomatic framework used is analogous to von Neumann-Morgenstern's utility theory for probabilistic lotteries as described by Luce and Raiffa. Unlike the probabilistic case, our axiomatic framework leads to interval-valued utilities, and therefore, to a partial (incomplete) preference order on the set of all belief function lotteries. If the belief function reference lotteries we use are Bayesian belief functions, then our representation theorem coincides with Jaffray's representation theorem for his linear utility theory for belief functions. We illustrate our framework using some examples discussed in the literature, and we propose a simple model based on an interval-valued pessimism index representing a decision-maker's attitude to ambiguity and indeterminacy. Finally, we compare our decision theory with those proposed by Jaffray, Smets, Dubois et al., Giang and Shenoy, and Shafer.
Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to propose an axiomatic utility theory for lotteries described by belief functions in the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence [5, 31] . The axiomatic theory is constructed similar to von Neumann-Morgenstern's (vN-M's) utility theory for probabilistic lotteries [43, 25, 24, 30, 27, 16] . Unlike the probabilistic case, our axiomatic theory leads to interval-valued utilities, and therefore to a partial (incomplete) preference order on the set of all belief function lotteries. Also, we compare our decision theory to those proposed by Jaffray [26] , Smets [40] , Dubois et al. [11] , Giang and Shenoy [19, 20] , and Shafer [36] .
In the foreword to Glenn Shafer's 1976 monograph [31] , Dempster writes: "... I believe that Bayesian inference will always be a basic tool for practical everyday statistics, if only because questions must be answered and decisions must be taken, so that a statistician must always stand ready to upgrade his vaguer forms of belief into precisely additive probabilities." More than 40 years after these lines were written, a lot of approaches to decision-making have been proposed (see the recent review in [7] ). However, most of these methods lack a strong theoretical basis. The most important steps toward a decision theory in the D-S framework have been made by Jaffray [26] , Smets [40] , and Shafer [36] . However, we argue that these proposals are either not sufficiently justified from the point of view of D-S theory, or not sufficiently developed for practical use. Our goal is to propose and justify a utility theory that is in line with vN-M's utility theory, but adapted to be used with lotteries whose uncertainty is described by D-S belief functions.
In essence, the D-S theory consists of representations-basic probability assignments (also called mass functions), belief functions, plausibility functions, etc.-together with Dempster's combination rule, and a rule for marginalizing joint belief functions. The representation part of the D-S theory is also used in various other theories of belief functions. For example, in the imprecise probability community, a belief function is viewed as the lower envelope of a convex set of probability mass functions called a credal set. Using these semantics, it makes more sense to use the Fagin-Halpern combination rule [15] (also proposed by de Campos et al. [4] ), rather than Dempster's combination rule [23, 34, 35] . The utility theory this article proposes is designed specifically for the D-S belief function theory, and not for the other theories of belief functions. This suggests that Dempster's combination rule should be an integral part of our theory, a property that is not satisfied in the proposals by Jaffray and Smets.
There is a large literature on decision making with a (credal) set of probability mass functions motivated by Ellsberg's paradox [14] . An influential work in this area is the axiomatic framework by Gilboa-Schmeidler [21] , where they use Choquet integration [3, 22] to compute expected utility. A belief function is a special case of a Choquet capacity. Jaffray's [26] work can also be regarded as belonging to the same line of research, although Jaffray works directly with belief functions without specifying a combination rule. A review of this literature can be found in, e.g., [17] , where the authors propose a modification of the Gilboa-Schmeidler [21] axioms. As we said earlier, our focus here is on decision-making with D-S theory of belief functions, and not on decision-making based in belief functions with a credal set interpretation. As we will see, our interval-valued utility functions lead to intervals that are contained in the Choquet lower and upper expected utility intervals.
The remainder of this article is as follows. In Section 2, we sketch vN-M's axiomatic utility theory for probabilistic lotteries as described by Luce and Raiffa [30] . In Section 3, we summarize the basic definitions in the D-S belief function theory. In Section 4, we describe our adaptation of vN-M's utility theory for lotteries in which uncertainty is described by D-S belief functions. Our assumptions lead to an interval-valued utility function, and consequently, to a partial (incomplete) preference order on the set of all belief function lotteries. We also describe a model for assessments of utilities. In Section 5, we compare our utility theory with those described by Jaffray [26] , Smets [40] , Dubois et al. [11] , Giang and Shenoy [19, 20] , and Shafer [36] . Finally, in Section 6, we summarize and conclude.
von Neumann-Morgenstern's Utility Theory
In this section, we describe vN-M's utility theory for decision under risk. Most of the material in this section is adapted from [30] . A decision problem can be seen as a situation in which a decision-maker (DM) has to choose a course of action (or act) in some set F. An act may have different outcomes, depending on the state of nature X. Exactly one state of nature will obtain, but this state is unknown. Denoting by Ω X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } the set of states of nature and by O = {O 1 , . . . , O r } the set of outcomes 1 , an act can thus be formalized as a mapping f from Ω to O. In this section, we assume that uncertainty about the state of nature is described by a probability mass function (PMF) p X on Ω X . If the DM selects act f , they will get outcome O i with probability
To each act f thus corresponds a PMF p = (p 1 , . . . , p r ) on O. We call L = [O, p] a probabilistic lottery. As only one state in Ω X will obtain, a probabilistic lottery will result in exactly one outcome O i (with probability p i ), and we suppose that the lottery will not be repeated. Another natural assumption is that two acts that induce the same lottery are equivalent: the problem of expressing preference between acts then boils down to expressing preference between lotteries. We are thus concerned with a DM who has preferences on L, the set of all probabilistic lotteries on O, and our task is to find a real-valued utility function u : L → R such that the DM strictly prefers L to L if and only if u(L) > u(L ), and the DM is indifferent between L and L if and only if u(L) = u(L ). We Of course, finding such a utility function is not always possible, unless the DM's preferences satisfy some assumptions. We can then construct a utility function that is linear in the sense that the utility of a lottery L = [O, p] is equal to its expected utility r i=1 p i u(O i ), where O i is regarded as a degenerate lottery where the only possible outcome is O i with probability 1. In the remainder of this section, we describe a set of assumptions that lead to the existence of such a linear utility function. is called a compound lottery whose outcome is exactly one lottery L (i) (with probability q i ), and lottery L (i) will result in one outcome O j (with probability p (i) j ). Notice that the PMF p (i) is a conditional PMF for O in the second stage given that lottery L (i) is realized (with probability q i > 0) in the first stage (see Figure 1 ). We can compute the joint PMF for (L, O), and then compute the marginal p of the joint for O. The following assumption states that the resulting lottery [O, p] is indifferent to the compound lottery [L, q].
Assumption 2.2 (Reduction of compound lotteries). Any compound lottery
for i = 1, . . . , r. PMF (p 1 , . . . , p r ) is the marginal for O of the joint PMF of (L, O).
A simple lottery involving only outcomes O 1 and O r with PMF (u, 1−u), where 0 ≤ u ≤ 1, is called a reference lottery, and is denoted by
Assumption 2.4 (Weak order). The preference relation for lotteries in L is a weak order, i.e., it is complete and transitive. Assumption 2.4 generalizes Assumption 2.1 for outcomes, which can be regarded as degenerate lotteries. 
then the result is a compound lottery that is indifferent to L (see Figure 2 ), i.e, Figure 3 ). This is expressed by Theorem 2.1 below. O r , we can deduce that 1 = u 1 ≥ u 2 ≥ · · · ≥ u r = 0. Assumptions 2.1-2.6 allow us to define the utility of a lottery as the probability of the best outcome O 1 in an indifferent reference lottery, and this utility function for lotteries on O is linear. This is stated by the following theorem. 
Thus, we can define the utility of lottery
. Also, such a linear utility function is unique up to a strictly increasing affine transformation, i.e., if u i = a u i +b, where a > 0 and b are real constants, then u(L) = r i=1 p i u i also qualifies as a utility function.
Basic Definitions in the D-S Belief Function Theory
In this section, we review the basic definitions in the D-S theory of belief functions. Like various uncertainty theories, D-S belief function theory includes functional representations of uncertain knowledge, and basic operations for making inferences from such knowledge. Most of this material is taken from [29] .
Representations of belief functions
Belief functions can be represented in several different ways, including as basic probability assignments, plausibility functions and belief functions. 2 These are briefly discussed below.
Definition 1 (Basic Probability Assignment). Suppose X is an unknown quantity (variable) with possible values (states) in a finite set Ω X called the state space of X. We assume that X takes one and only one value in Ω X , but this value is unknown. Let 2 Ω X denote the set of all subsets of Ω X . A basic probability assignment (BPA) m X for X is a function m X : 2 Ω X → [0, 1] such that a⊆Ω X m X (a) = 1, and m X (∅) = 0.
The subsets a ⊆ Ω X such that m X (a) > 0 are called focal sets of m X . An example of a BPA for X is the vacuous BPA for X, denoted by ι X , such that ι X (Ω X ) = 1. We say that m X is deterministic if m X has a single focal set (with mass 1). Thus, the vacuous BPA for X is deterministic with focal set Ω X . If all focal sets of m X are singleton subsets (of Ω X ), then we say that m X is Bayesian. In this case, m X is equivalent to the PMF P X for X such that P X (x) = m X ({x}) for each x ∈ Ω X . Definition 2 (Plausibility Function). The information in a BPA m X can be represented by a corresponding plausibility function P l m X defined as follows:
For an example, suppose Ω X = {x,x}. Then, the plausibility function P l ι X corresponding to BPA ι X is given by P l ι X (∅) = 0, P l ι X ({x}) = 1, P l ι X ({x}) = 1, and P l ι X (Ω X ) = 1.
Definition 3 (Belief Function). The information in a BPA m X can also be represented by a corresponding belief function Bel m X that is defined as follows:
For the example above with Ω X = {x,x}, the belief function Bel ι X corresponding to BPA ι X is given by Bel ι X (∅) = 0, Bel ι X ({x}) = 0, Bel ι X ({x}) = 0, and Bel ι X (Ω X ) = 1. For any proposition a ∈ 2 Ω X , it is easy to see that Bel m X (a) ≤ P l m X (a). Thus, if a DM's belief in proposition a is an interval, say [p, p + q], where p, q ≥ 0 and p + q ≤ 1, then such beliefs can be represented by a BPA m X such that m X (a) = p, m X (Ω X \ a) = 1 − p − q, and m X (Ω X ) = q. For such a BPA, Bel m X (a) = p ≤ p + q = P l m X (a).
All three representations-BPA, belief and plausibility functions-have exactly the same information, as any one of them allows us to recover the other two [31] . Next, we describe the two main operations for making inferences.
Basic operations in the D-S theory
There are two main operations in the D-S theory-Dempster's combination rule and marginalization.
Dempster's Combination Rule. In the D-S theory, we can combine two BPAs m 1 and m 2 representing distinct pieces of evidence by Dempster's rule [5] and obtain the BPA m 1 ⊕ m 2 , which represents the combined evidence. Dempster refers to this rule as the productintersection rule, as the product of the BPA values are assigned to the intersection of the focal sets, followed by normalization. Normalization consists of discarding the mass assigned to ∅, and normalizing the remaining values so that they add to 1. In general, Dempster's rule of combination can be used to combine two BPAs for arbitrary sets of variables.
Let X denote a finite set of variables. The state space of X is × X∈X Ω X . Thus, if
Projection of states simply means dropping extra coordinates; for example, if (x, y) is a state of {X, Y }, then the projection of (x, y) to X, denoted by (x, y) ↓X , is simply x, which is a state of X. Projection of subsets of states is achieved by projecting every state in the subset.
Vacuous extension of a subset of states of X 1 to a subset of states of X 2 , where X 2 ⊇ X 1 , is a cylinder set extension, i.e., if a ∈ 2 X 1 , then
Definition 4 (Dempster's rule using BPAs). Suppose m 1 and m 2 are BPAs for X 1 and X 2 , respectively. Then m 1 ⊕ m 2 is a BPA for X 1 ∪ X 2 = X , say, given by (m 1 ⊕ m 2 )(∅) = 0 and
for all a ⊆ Ω X , where K is a normalization constant given by
The definition of Dempster's rule assumes that the normalization constant K is nonzero. If K = 0, then the two BPAs m 1 and m 2 are said to be in total conflict and cannot be combined. If K = 1, we say m 1 and m 2 are non-conflicting.
Marginalization. Marginalization in D-S theory is addition of values of BPAs.
Conditional belief functions
In probability theory, it is common to construct joint PMFs for a set of discrete variables by using conditional probability distributions. For example, we can construct joint PMF for (X, Y ) by first assessing PMF P X of X, and conditional PMFs P Y |x for each x ∈ Ω X such that P X (x) > 0. The pointwise multiplication of P Y |x for all x ∈ Ω X is called a CPT, and denoted by P Y |X . Then, P X,Y = P X ⊗ P Y |X . We can construct joint BPA for {X, Y } in a similar manner.
Suppose that there is a BPA for Y expressing our belief about Y if we know that X = x, and denote it by
We can embed this conditional BPA for Y into a BPA for {X, Y }, which is denoted by m x,Y , such that the following three conditions hold. First, m x,Y tells us nothing about X, i.e.,
The least committed way to obtain such an embedding, called conditional embedding, was derived by Smets [38, 39] (see also [33] ). It consists of taking each focal set b ∈ 2 Ω Y of m Y |x , and converting it to a corresponding focal set of m x,Y (with the same mass) as follows:
where {x} denotes the complement of {x} in Ω X . It is easy to confirm that this method of embedding satisfies the three conditions mentioned above, and m x,Y is the least committed (minimally informative) BPA verifying this property.
There are some differences with conditional probability distributions. First, in probability theory, P Y |X consists of all conditional distributions P Y |x that are well-defined, i.e., for all x ∈ Ω X such that P X (x) > 0. In D-S belief function theory, we do not have similar constraints. We can include only those non-vacuous conditionals m Y |x such that m X ({x}) > 0. Also, if we have more than one conditional BPA for Y , given, say for X = x 1 , and X = x 2 (assuming m X ({x 1 }) > 0, and m X ({x 2 }) > 0), we embed these two conditionals for Y to get BPAs m x 1 ,Y and m x 2 ,Y for {X, Y }, and then combine them using Dempster's rule of combination to
Second, given any joint PMF P X,Y for {X, Y }, we can always factor this into P ↓X X,Y = P X for X, and P Y |X for {X, Y }, such that P X,Y = P X ⊗ P Y |X . This is not true in D-S belief function theory. Given a joint BPA m X,
However, we can always construct joint BPA m X,Y for {X, Y } by first assessing m X for X, and assessing conditionals m Y |x i for Y for those x i that we have knowledge about and such that m X ({x i }) > 0, embed these conditionals into BPAs for {X, Y }, and combine all such BPAs to obtain the BPA m Y |X for {X, Y }. An implicit assumption here is that BBAs m x i ,Y are distinct, and it is acceptable to combine them using Dempster's rule. We can then construct m X,
This completes our brief review of the D-S belief function theory. For further details, the reader is referred to [31] and to [8] for a recent review.
A Utility Theory for D-S Belief Function Theory
In this section, we describe a new utility theory for lotteries where the uncertainty is described by D-S belief functions. These lotteries, called belief function lotteries, 3 will be introduced in Section 4.1. We present and discuss assumptions in Section 4.2 and state a representation theorem in Section 4.3. Finally, we describe a practical model allowing us to compute the utility of a bf lottery based on two parameters in Section 4.4.
Belief function lotteries
We generalize the decision framework outline in Section 2 by assuming that uncertainty about the state of nature X is described by a BPA m X for X. The probabilistic framework is recovered as a special case when m X is Bayesian. As before, we define an act as a mapping f from Ω X to the set O of outcomes. Mapping f pushes m X forward from Ω X to O, transferring each mass m X (a) for a ∈ 2 Ω X to the image of subset a by f , denoted as [44] calls the principle of complete ignorance (PCI). It implies that two acts resulting in the same bf lottery are equivalent. The problem of expressing preferences between acts becomes that of expressing preferences between bf lotteries.
Remark 1. As a consequence of the PCI, preferences between acts do not depend on the cardinality of the state space Ω X in case of complete ignorance. For instance, assume that we define Ω X = {x 1 , x 2 }, and we are completely ignorant of the state of nature, so that our belief state is described by the vacuous BPA m X (Ω X ) = 1. Consider two acts f 1 and f 2 that yield $100 if, respectively, x 1 or x 2 occurs, and $0 otherwise. These two acts induce the same vacuous bf lottery m(O) = 1 with O = {$100, $0}: consequently, they are equivalent according to the PCI. Now, assume that we decide to express the states of nature with finer granularity and we refine state x 1 into two states x 11 and x 12 .
Let Ω X = {x 11 , x 12 , x 2 } denote the refined frame. We still have m X (Ω X ) = 1 and m(O) = 1, so that our preferences between acts f 1 and f 2 are unchanged. We note that a Bayesian DM applying Laplace's principle of indifference (PI) would reach a different conclusion: before the refinement, the PI implies p X (x 1 ) = p X (x 2 ) = 1/2, which results in the same probabilistic lottery p = (1/2, 1/2) on O = {$100, $0} for the two acts, but after the refinement the same principle gives us p X (x 11 ) = p X (x 12 ) = p X (x 2 ) = 1/3; this results in two different lotteries p 1 = (2/3, 1/3) for act f 1 and p 2 = (1/3, 2/3) for act f 2 , which makes f 1 strictly preferable to f 2 . Considering that the granularity of the state space is often partly arbitrary (as discussed by Shafer in [31] ), we regard this property of invariance to refinement under complete ignorance as a valuable feature of a decision theory based on D-S belief functions.
We are thus concerned with a DM who has preferences on L bf , the set of all bf lotteries. Our task is to find a utility function u : L bf → [R], where [R] denotes the set of closed real intervals, such that the u(L) = [u, u + w] is viewed as an interval-valued utility of L. The interval-valued utility can be interpreted as follows: u and u+w are, respectively, the degrees of belief and plausibility of receiving the best outcome in a bf reference lottery equivalent to L. Given two lotteries L and L , L is preferred to L if and only if u ≥ u and u + w ≥ u + w . This leads to incomplete preferences on the set of all bf lotteries. If we assume w = 0 for all bf lotteries, then we have a real-valued utility function on L bf , and consequently, complete preferences. 
Example 2 (Ellsberg's Urn). Ellsberg [14] describes a decision problem that questions the adequacy of the vN-M axiomatic framework. Suppose we have an urn with 90 balls, of which 30 are red, and the remaining 60 are either black or yellow. We draw a ball at random from the urn. Let X denote the color of the ball drawn, with Ω X = {r, b, y}. Notice that the uncertainty of X can be described by a BPA m X for X such that m X ({r}) = 1/3, and m X ({b, y}) = 2/3. First, we are offered a choice between Lottery L 1 : $100 on red, and Lottery L 2 : $100 on black, i.e., in L 1 , you get $100 if the ball drawn is red, and $0 if the ball drawn is black or yellow, and in L 2 , you get $100 if the ball drawn is black and $0 if the ball drawn is red or yellow. Choice of L 1 can be denoted by alternative
Notice that L 1 and L 2 are bf lotteries. Ellsberg notes that a frequent pattern of response is
Second, we are offered a choice between L 3 : $100 on red or yellow, and L 4 : $100 on black or yellow, i.e., in L 3 you get $100 if the ball drawn is red or yellow, and $0 if the ball drawn is black, and in L 4 , you get $100 if the ball drawn is black or yellow, and $0 if the ball drawn is red. L 3 can be represented by BPA m 3 as follows: m 3 ({$100}) = 1/3, and m 3 ({$0, $100}) = 2/3, and L 4 can be represented by the BPA m 4 as follows: m 4 ({$0}) = 1/3, m 4 ({$100}) = 2/3. L 3 and L 4 are also belief function lotteries. Ellsberg notes that L 4 is often strictly preferred to L 3 . Also, the same subjects who prefer L 1 to L 2 , prefer L 4 to L 3 . Table 1 is a summary of the four bf lotteries.
Thus, if the outcomes of a lottery are based on the states of a random variable X, which is described by a BPA m X for X, then we have a belief function lottery. In this example, we have only two outcomes, $100, and $0. L 1 and L 4 can also be regarded as probabilistic lotteries as the corresponding BPAs are Bayesian. L 2 and L 3 have BPAs with non-singleton focal sets. Thus, these two lotteries can be considered as involving "ambiguity" as the exact distribution of the probability (of 2/3) between outcomes $100 and $0 is unknown. Regardless of how the probability of 2/3 is distributed between b and y, the preferences of subjects violate the tenets of vN-M utility theory.
Assumptions of our framework
As in the probabilistic case, we will assume that a DM's preferences for bf lotteries are reflexive and transitive. However, unlike the probabilistic case (Assumption 2.4), we do not assume that these preferences are complete. In the probabilistic case, incomplete preferences are studied in [1] , and in the case of sets of utility functions, in [12] .
Our first assumption is identical to Assumption 2.1. This allows us to label the outcomes such that
Let 
and m L j ,j is a BPA for (L, O) obtained from m j|L j by conditional embedding, for j = 1, . . . , s.
The following proposition states that Assumption 4.2 generalizes Assumption 2.2. 
for i = 1, . . . , r.
Proof. The conditional embedding of m j|L j is given by , which are all non-negative and sum to 1. The following assumption states that any deterministic bf lottery is equally preferred to some bf reference lottery. 
where u a , v a , w a ≥ 0, and u a + v a + w a = 1. Furthermore, w a = 0 if a = {O i } is a singleton subset.
Notice that Bel ma ({O 1 }) = u a , and P l ma ({O 1 }) = u a + w a = 1 − v a . For singleton subsets, the equivalent bf reference lottery is Bayesian: this ensures that Assumption 4.3 is a generalization of Assumption 2.3. For non-singleton subsets a of outcomes, we may have w a > 0, i.e., the bf reference lottery may not be Bayesian. In other words, we do not assume that ambiguity can be resolved by selecting an equivalent probabilistic reference lottery. In contrast with the probabilistic case (Assumption 2.4), we do not assume that is complete. There are many reasons we may not wish to assume completeness. It is not descriptive of human behavior. Even from a normative point of view, it is questionable that a DM has complete preferences on all possible lotteries. The assumption of incomplete preferences is consistent with the D-S theory of belief functions where we have non-singleton focal sets. Several authors, such as Aumann [1] , and Dubra et al. [12] argue why the assumption of complete preferences may not be realistic in many circumstances.
The substitutability assumption is similar to the probabilistic case (Assumption 2.5)-we replace an outcome in the probabilistic case by a focal set of m in the bf case. It follows from Assumptions 4.1-4.5 that given any bf lottery, we can reduce it to an equally preferred bf reference lottery. This is stated as Theorem 4.1 below. 
where u a i , v a i and w a i are the masses assigned, respectively, to {O 1 }, {O r } and O 2 by the bf reference lottery a i equivalent to a i .
Proof. From 
where m a,i is the BPA for O 2 obtained from m i| a i by conditional embedding. If we have
= v a i and m i| a i (O 2 ) = w a i , then after conditional embedding BPA m a i ,i is as follows: 
for all partitions (I 1 , I 2 , I 3 ) i of {1, . . . , k}, and the corresponding value of m 0 is: = k i=i m(a i )w a i . Next, we formulate the monotonicity assumption. This is less obvious than it was in the probabilistic case (Assumption 2.6), as there are several ways in which intervals may be ordered. Assumption 4.6 below states that, given two bf reference lotteries L and L , the former will be preferred if and only if it assigns a higher degree of belief to the best consequence O 1 , and a lower degree of belief to the worst consequence O r . Assumptions 4.1, 4.3 and 4.6 imply the following consistency constraints between the reference bf lotteries equivalent to single outcomes: 
and
Thus, for a bf lottery L = [O, m], we can define
as an interval-valued utility of L, with
Also, such a utility function is unique up to a strictly increasing affine transformation, i.e., if u = a u + b, and w = a w + b, where a > 0, and b are real constants, then The utility function in Eq. (23) has exactly the same form as Jaffray's linear utility [26] . This is discussed further in Section 5.1.
Next, we illustrate the application of Theorem 4.2 to some examples: Ellsberg's urn problem described in Example 2, the one red ball problem described in [28] , and the 1,000 balls urns described in [2] .
Example 4 (Ellsberg's urn). Consider the four bf lotteries described in Example 2 (also in Table 1 
as long as u {$100, $0} +w {$100, $0} < 1/2, a result that is also consistent with Ellsberg's empirical findings.
Example 5 (One red ball). Consider the following example called 'one red ball' in [28] . An urn possibly contains balls of six colors: red (r), blue (b), green (g), orange (o), white (w), and yellow (y). One ball is drawn at random from the urn. We are informed that the urn has a total of n balls, where n is a positive integer, and that there is exactly one red ball in the urn. Suppose random variable X denotes the color of the ball drawn from the urn.
Then Ω X = {r, b, g, o, w, y}, and m X is a BPA for X such that m X ({r}) = 1/n, and m X ({b, g, o, w, y}) = (n − 1)/n. First, you pick a color, and then you draw a ball at random from the urn. You win $100 if the color of the ball drawn from the urn matches the color you picked and you win $0 if it doesn't. What color do you pick? In [28] , the authors describe some informal experiments where all respondents chose red for n ≤ 7, and for n ≥ 8, several respondents preferred a color different from red. So, L b is strictly preferred to L r whenever
i.e., whenever u {$100, $0} > 1/(n − 1), and L r is strictly preferred to L b whenever
i.e., whenever u {$100, $0} + w {$100, $0} < 1/(n − 1). Hence, L b is increasingly preferred to L r when n increases, which is consistent with the findings reported in [28] . In our model, when
the two lotteries L r and L b are incomparable. If forced to choose, the DM might just choose arbitrarily. As the experiment reported in [28] did not allow the respondents to express inability to choose between the two lotteries, it does not provide any evidence for or against our model.
Example 6 (Urns with 1,000 balls). The following example is discussed in [2] , where it is credited to Ellsberg in an oral conversation (with the authors of [2] ). It is also discussed in [13] . There are two urns, each with 1,000 balls, numbered from 1 − 1, 000. Urn 1 has exactly one ball for each number, and there is no ambiguity. Urn 2 has unknown number of balls of each number, and there is much ambiguity. One ball is to be chosen at random from an urn of your choosing. If the number on the ball matches a specific number, e.g., 687, you win $100, and if not, you win nothing ($0). Which one of the two urns will you choose? It is reported in [2] that many respondents chose Urn 2. Why? Urn 1 has only one ball numbered 687, and therefore, the probability of winning $100 if the choice is Urn 1 is very small, 0.001. Urn 2 could possibly have anywhere from 0 to 1, 000 balls numbered 687. Thus, the choice of Urn 2, although ambiguous, is appealing. Let's analyze this problem using Theorem 4.2.
Let X 1 denote the number on the ball chosen Urn 1, and let X 2 denote the number on the ball chosen Urn 2. Ω X 1 = Ω X 2 = {1, . . . , 1000}. Function m X 1 is a BPA for X 1 as follows: m X 1 ({1}) = . . . = m X 1 ({1000}) = 0.001. BPA m X 2 is vacuous, i.e., m X 2 (Ω X 2 ) = 1.
Lottery L 1 corresponding to choice of Urn 1 (say, alternative f 1 ) is [{$100, $0}, m 1 ], where m 1 is a BPA for {$100, $0} such that m 1 ({$100}) = 0.001, and m 1 ({$0}) = 0.999. L 1 is a bf reference lottery, and thus, [u](L 1 ) = [0.001, 0.001]. Lottery L 2 corresponding to choice of Urn 2 (say, alternative
Consequently, L 2 is preferred to L 1 as long as
a condition that is easily satisfied. This may explain why many DMs prefer to be ambiguityseeking in this context, i.e., prefer L 2 to L 1 .
A practical model for assessments of utilities
Whereas Theorem 4.2 guarantees the existence of an interval valued utility function for bf lotteries, there remains the problem of practical elicitation of utilities. The number of utilities to be elicited for each bf lottery equals twice the number of its focal sets, which can be as high as 2 |O| − 1 in the worst case. By making one more reasonable assumption, we can drastically limit the number of parameters to be elicited. Assumption 4.7 below has no counterpart in the vN-M theory, but it is rooted in decisionmaking under ignorance [26, 44] . For any nonempty subset of consequences a ⊆ O, let O a and O a denote, respectively, the worst and the best outcome in a. To simplify the notations, we assimilate a deterministic BPA with its focal set, and we write a b to mean that the deterministic lottery with focal set a is preferred or indifferent to the deterministic lottery with focal set b. Then our last assumption can be stated as follows. Assumption 4.7 implies that the preference between two deterministic lotteries with focal sets a and b is determined only by the best and worst outcomes in a and b. In particular, when O a = O b and O a = O b , then a ∼ b. Although counterintuitive at first glance, this assumption cannot be avoided if we accept the PCI, as shown by the following example.
Example 7. Assume that the set of outcomes is O = {$0, $1, $999, $1, 000}. According to Assumption 4.7, a DM would be indifferent between receiving one of the prizes in a = {$0, $1, $1, 000}, without any further information, and receiving one of the prizes in b = {$0, $999, $1, 000}. It may be argued that most DMs would strictly prefer b to a. Yet, assume that the state space is Ω X = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 , ω 4 }, we are in a state of complete ignorance, i.e., m X (Ω X ) = 1, and the deterministic lotteries a and b are generated by the acts f 1 and f 2 shown in Table 2 . It is clear that f 1 dominates f 2 (it yields at least as desirable consequences for all states of nature, and strictly preferred consequences for some states of nature), so it would be paradoxical to strictly prefer f 2 over f 1 , i.e., to strictly prefer b over a. But a and b might also have been generated by acts f 1 and f 2 in Table 2 and, as f 2 dominates f 1 , it would also be paradoxical to strictly prefer f 1 over f 2 , i.e., to strictly prefer a over b. Consequently, indifference between a and b seems to be the only rational option in this case.
Jaffray [26] shows that, whenever O a O b and O a O b , we can always construct a state space Ω X and two acts f 1 and f 2 such that f 1 [Ω X ] = a, f 2 [Ω X ] = b and, for any ω ∈ Ω X , f 1 (ω) f 2 (ω). As f 1 yields at least as desirable outcomes as f 2 under any state of nature, it should be preferred whatever our beliefs on Ω X , and in particular when m X (Ω X ) = 1. Hence, we should have a b.
Assumption 4.7 implies that a O a and O a a. From Assumption 4.6, we thus have u a ≥ u O a and u a + w a ≤ u Oa . Consequently, the utility bounds u a and u a + w a of subset a can be written as convex combinations of the utilities of its worst and best outcomes: • In particular, when α = β = 0, then
which is the lower expected utility u m with respect to m [5, 32, 6] . As shown by Gilboa and Schmeidler [22] , u m is also the Choquet expected utility [3] with respect to the 20 belief function Bel m corresponding to m. The preference relation between bf lotteries then corresponds to the maximin criterion, which reflects a pessimistic attitude of the DM.
• Similarly, when α = β = 1, we get
which is the upper expected utility u m , or the Choquet expected utility with respect to the plausibility function P l m corresponding to m [22] . The corresponding decision strategy corresponds to the maximax criterion, which models an optimistic attitude of the DM.
• When α = 0 and β = 1, then the interval-valued utility is equal to the lower-upper expected utility interval
The corresponding preference relation is then the interval bound dominance relation [10, 7] , defined by L L ⇔ (u m ≥ u m and u m ≥ u m ) .
In the general case, we have
where u and w are as in Eq. 
Comparison with Some Existing Decision Theories
In this section, we compare our utility theory to Jaffray's linear utility theory [26] , Smets' two-level decision theory [40] , decision theories for possibility theory [11, 19] and partially consonant belief functions [20] , and Shafer's constructive decision theory [36] .
Comparison with Jaffray's Axiomatic Theory
Jaffray Also, there is no explicit notion of a bf reference lottery in Jaffray's framework. Thanks to our continuity axiom (Assumption 4.3), the interval-valued utility [u a , u a + w a ] in our framework receives a simple interpretation as an interval-valued probability of a best outcome O 1 , in a bf reference lottery [O 2 , m a ] that is indifferent to a and such that m a ({O 1 }) = u a , m a ({O r }) = 1 − (u a + w a ), and m a (O 2 ) = w a . We believe that this simple interpretation can be very helpful when eliciting utilities from DMs.
Comparison with Smets' Decision Theory
Smets' decision theory [40] is a two-level framework where beliefs, represented by belief functions, are held at a credal level. When a DM has to make a decision, the marginal belief function for a variable of interest is transformed into a PMF, and the Bayesian expected utility framework is then used to make a decision.
Smets uses a transformation called the pignistic transform to transform belief functions into PMFs. This transform is justified in [41] using a mixture property as follows. Let T denote the belief-PMF transformation. Smets [41] argues that this transformation should be linear, i.e., we should have, for any λ ∈ [0, 1],
The unique transformation T verifying (31) 
It is a special case of Eq. (23), with
Smets' decision theory thus amounts to assuming that a DM is indifferent between a bf lottery that gives them an outcome in a for sure, and a bf reference lottery in which the probability of the best outcome is equal to the average utilities of the outcomes in a. This is consistent with our Assumptions 4.1-4.6, but it is inconsistent with Assumption 4.7. For instance, in Example 7, a DM using the pignistic criterion would strictly prefer b to a, even though the act f 1 generating a dominates the act f 2 generating b. Moreover, this restricted model does not have any parameter to represent a DM's attitude toward ambiguity. As a result, it is unable to explain Ellsberg's paradox and the ambiguity aversion of human DMs as described, e.g., in the examples presented in Section 4.3.
Comparison with Other Axiomatic Theories
In this subsection, we compare our axiomatic decision theory with other axiomatic decision theories for D-S belief functions.
Dubois et al. [11] describe an axiomatic decision theory for the case where uncertainty is described by a possibility distribution, which is a special case of a belief function with nested focal elements (such a belief function is said to be consonant). Dubois et al.'s decision theory consists of two sets of axioms, one for the pessimistic case, and one for the optimistic case. In contrast, Giang and Shenoy [19] propose an axiomatic theory for possibility theory with one set of axioms, and the utility function is binary-valued (binary-valued utilities are possibility distribution values of O 1 and O r for possibilistic reference lotteries). The two axiomatic theories for possibility theory are compared in detail in [19] . The latter theory is generalized in terms of partially consonant belief functions in [20] . A partially consonant belief function is a belief function where the set of focal elements can divided into groups such that (a) the focal elements in different groups are disjoint, and (b) the focal elements in the same group are nested. The family of partially consonant belief functions include Bayesian belief functions and consonant belief functions.
Giang [18] compares the Giang-Shenoy decision theory for partially consonant belief functions with Jaffray's axiomatic decision theory for general belief functions. Similar to Jaffray's theory, our decision theory is for the case of general belief functions. While our utility is interval-based, leading to incomplete preferences, Jaffray's theory for general belief functions, and Giang-Shenoy's theory for partially consonant belief functions based on binary utility, result in complete preferences, which is a special case of our theory. Walley [45] argues that partially consonant belief functions is the only class of D-S belief functions that is consistent with the likelihood principle of statistics, but this argument applies only to statistical inference, and not to uncertain reasoning in general.
Comparison with Shafer's Constructive Decision Theory
Shafer [36] argues for a decision theory that allows us to construct both goals and beliefs in response to a decision. In the vN-M utility theory, we start with a probabilistic lottery, and construct a utility function that reflects a DM's risk attitude. Thus, probabilities and utilities are separate constructs that are then combined for the computation of expected utility. In many situations, we have neither objective nor subjective probabilities. For such situations, Shafer argues for constructing belief functions from available evidence, and constructing a set of consistent and monotonic goals. Given a set of actions, we examine which goals each of the actions will achieve. We use belief functions to make judgments based on evidence about what will happen if an action is taken. We then use these belief functions to compute the expected number of goals that an action will satisfy, and pick an action that satisfies the most goals. This can be generalized to the case where not all goals are equally weighted, some are weighted more than others.
Our utility theory is more in line with vN-M utility theory than Shafer's constructive decision theory. There is considerable literature in many domains about the use of utility theory for decision making. While Shafer's constructive decision theory is intriguing and may indicate an interesting direction to explore, there is much to be done before we can apply it in many domains for which we have a decision theory in the vN-M style.
Summary and Conclusions
In this section, we summarize our proposal and sketch some future work. We start with Luce and Raiffa's version of the vN-M utility theory for probabilistic lotteries. We then consider bf lotteries, lotteries when our beliefs about the state of the world is described by DS belief functions. We use a similar set of axioms as vN-M, but first we replace each singleton outcome in a probabilistic lottery by a focal set of a BPA. Second, we replace the reduction of compound lotteries with a corresponding axiom that uses Dempster's combination rule and belief function marginalization in place of probabilistic combination (pointwise multiplication followed by normalization) and probabilistic marginalization (addition). Third, we use a bf reference lottery with two independent parameters. The axioms lead to a decision theory that involves assessing the utility of each focal element of a BPA as an interval-valued utility. Interval-valued utilities lead to a partial preference relation on the set L bf of all bf lotteries. If we use Bayesian bf reference lotteries with a single parameter, then our axiomatic framework leads to a real-valued utility function that is exactly the same as in Jaffray's linear utility theory [26] .
The decision theory that results from our axioms is more general than that proposed by Jaffray [26] , which can be construed as a decision theory for belief functions interpreted as generalized probabilities. Jaffray's axiomatic theory is based on a set of mixture BPAs. A mixture of two BPAs is not the same as a Dempster's combination of two BPAs, although we could construct a belief function model where the mixture BPA is obtained by Dempster's rule. Thus, it is not clear if Jaffray's linear utility theory is applicable to D-S belief function lotteries or not. Our utility theory confirms that this is indeed the case. Our bf reference lotteries lead to interval-valued utilities, and consequently, a partial preference relation on the set of all bf lotteries.
We also compare our axiomatic theory to Smets' two-level framework [40, 41] , and note that his framework is too constrained to explain ambiguity-aversion or ambiguity-seeking behavior of human DMs. Other axiomatic decision theories proposed by Dubois et al. [11] and Giang and Shenoy [19, 20] are restricted to consonant or quasi-consonant belief functions. Shafer [36] has recently published his constructive decision theory where he rejects the separation of beliefs and utilities. He proposes, instead, constructing a set of consistent and monotonic goals, and measuring the utility of each choice by the number of goals (or weighted goals) achieved by the choice. Shafer's constructive decision theory needs to be fleshed out before it can be applied to practical decision-making situations.
In practice, implementing the most general form of our axiomatic theory may need assessment of 2 k parameters, where k is the number of focal sets of a bf lottery. In the worst case, k can be as large as 2 |O| − 1. Based on additional assumptions, we propose a model based on only two parameters, which can be interpreted as reflecting both the DM's attitude to ambiguity and their indeterminacy. This model, as well as others, will have to be further studied and developed. More generally, a rigorous methodology to elicit interval-valued utilities remains to be designed.
